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Abstract
We model demand for diﬀerent classes of antibiotics used for respiratory
infections in outpatient care using a linear approximate almost ideal demand
system approach. We compute elasticities to socioeconomic determinants of
consumption and own- and cross- price elasticities between diﬀerent groups
of antibiotics. We find significant elasticities between newer/more expensive
generations and older/less expensive generations of antibiotics. The larger use
of more expensive antibiotics is also associated with the self-dispensing status
of practices, ceteris paribus.
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1 Introduction
Antibiotics diﬀer from other pharmaceutical products in many peculiar aspects (El-
lison and Hellerstein, 1999). Because of their pharmacological characteristics, they
are generally prescribed by doctors. Consequently, patients’ preferences for specific
therapeutical components may be of little relevance. On the other hand, such aspects
as the price may play an important role if consumers bear directly a substantial share
of the cost of drugs.
In primary care, doctors may face a first tradeoﬀ between prescribing or delaying
an antibiotic therapy under uncertainty on the nature of patient’s infection (viral
or bacterial). Although the antibiotic therapy is not eﬀective against common viral
infections, expected cost savings (time and troubles) in the case of bacterial infections
may overcome the expected social loss from bacterial resistance. From the economic
point of view, bacterial resistance accounts for relevant external eﬀects. First, several
antibiotic therapies can be prescribed before finding the eﬀective one, hence leading
to income loss or even premature deaths. Second, the reduced eﬀectiveness of drugs
increase social costs to produce new generations of pharmaceutical components.
A second tradeoﬀ is observed between prescribing broad spectrum or narrow spec-
trum antibiotics. Although the intensive use of broad spectrum components reduces
uncertainty in the outcome of the treatment, this may generate higher levels of bac-
terial resistance. It has been argued that the persistent use of one type of antibiotics
may be sub-optimal for the society. The literature suggests that the negative exter-
nality of resistance can be reduced by changing the type of antibiotic used (Ellison
and Hellerstein 1999; Laxminarayan and Weitzman, 2002; Rowthorn and Brown,
2003), since the same type of bacteria may be susceptible to more than one antibiotic
component.1
1Increasing rates of Streptococcus pneumonie strains resistant to penicillin has led to the use
of macrolides. However, the clinical eﬀectiveness of the latter category has began to decrease as
well (Alvarez-Elcoros and Enzler, 1999). The analysis by Ednie et al. (1996) suggests that in areas
where penicillin-resistant strains are common, the empirical antibiotherapy using macrolides should
then be changed.
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Regional heterogeneity in the mix of antibiotics used has been recently observed
within countries (Filippini et al., 2006; Kern et al., 2006). This may indicate that
some antibiotic components are preferred by local physicians, which raises the issue
of optimal use at local level. The increase of resistant organisms force physicians
to face an eﬀectiveness constraint in substituting away some types of antibiotics
with newer and more eﬀective ones.2 However, substantial local diﬀerences in the
mix of antibiotics can hardly be explained only by levels of bacterial resistance and,
consequently, the internalization in doctors’ decisions. There is no evidence that
bacterial resistance significantly varies at local level but the availability of detailed
information on its impact and the spread of local guidelines is quite poor. More
plausibly, in our view, doctors diﬀer in attitudes towards the same type of antibiotics
and their strategies can be influenced by patients’ characteristics, antibiotic price and
economic incentives.
The current paper focuses on factors aﬀecting the local mix of main antibiotics
categories. The analysis suggests that policy instruments, such as locally diﬀerenti-
ated taxes on antibacterials aﬀected by resistance problems, may induce a better use
of antibiotics.
The demand for specific antibiotic classes has been investigated in studies by
Ellison et al. (1997) and Chaudhuri et al. (2003). The focus is on the structure of
the demand for two segments of the market: cephalosporins and quinolones. Demand
is modelled in two stages: a substance is firstly chosen among a set of substances
and a brand/generic version of the product is chosen afterwards. The approach is
suitable for the analysis of specific categories of antibiotics since substances constitute
close therapeutic substitutes and may be similar in tems of the impact of bacterial
resistance. The models rely, however, on the hypothesis that physicians’ decisions
within a given antibiotic category do not depend on the availability of alternative
categories and are firstly based on specific names of substances. We argue that this
is not the most realistic scenario and may rather reflect the chemist’s view. Instead,
2The resistance-induced antibiotic substitution has been recently addressed by Howard (2004)
among others.
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doctors seem to be more concerned with the eﬀectiveness of a broad category of
antibiotics compared to another one. Moreover, their choices are likely to be aﬀected
by perceived resistance for specific antibiotic categories. Doctors may then choose
among a limited (broad) set of antibiotic categories classified according to the common
practice and shared beliefs regarding their eﬀectiveness.
We intend to investigate the structure of the demand for antibiotics used for res-
piratory infections by modelling the decision process of rationale physicians. We are
interested in price and income sensibility of diﬀerent antibiotic categories. Similarly
to Ellison et al. (1997) and Chaudhuri et al. (2003), we model antibiotic demand
as a multistage budgeting problem but do not separate all specific substances and
generic/brand names for each of them. Instead, we consider a wider set of sub-
stances, those that can be prescribed for common respiratory infections in outpatient
care. Outpatient antibiotics are aggregated in four groups (classic penicillins, peni-
cillins amoxi/clav plus 1stand 2nd generations of cephalosporins, 3rd generation of
cephalosporins and quinolones, macrolides), according to what are plausible alterna-
tives in the treatment of respiratory infections.3
The allocation of antibiotic expenditure across antibiotic groups is analysed us-
ing the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) specification proposed by Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980). The AIDS model is commonly used to estimate price and income
elasticities of the demand for goods when expenditure share data are available.4 We
compute own- and cross- price elasticities between old and new generations of antibi-
otics and between antibiotics diﬀerently aﬀected by bacterial resistance using data
from small geographic areas in Switzerland. We also estimate conditional expenditure
elasticities and marginal expenditures shares for each group of antibiotics.
3Most of the antibiotics used in outpatient care are for the treatment of respiratory infections
(Blasi et al., 2006; Gonzalves et al., 2001). We focus on this category and exclude antibiotics mainly
used for other types of infections. Hence, our categories include all plausible therapeutic substitutes.
4Ma and al. (2004) estimated the share equations of animal product consumption for Chinese
households. Combining the AIDS model and the two-stage Heckman procedure, Lazaridis (2004)
focused on the factors aﬀecting the demand for diﬀerent types of oils and fats in Greece. Boetel and
Liu (2003) estimated a meat demand system and investigated the eﬀect of food information on the
meat shares consumed.
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The structure of the article is as follows. In section 2 we sketch the application of
the linear approximate AIDS model to the demand of antibiotics and discuss some
testable hypothesis on elasticities. In section 3 we discuss the data and summarize
the variables used in the model. Section 4 gives some results and section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we present a model of demand for antibiotics in outpatient care based
on the AIDS model. We hypothesize that the individual utility derived from the
use of antibiotics is weakly separable from quantities of all other types of goods
consumed. Consequently, consumers follow a multistage process to allocate their
budget to antibacterial products. In the first stage, the total spending is allocated to
broad categories of goods, such as health care versus other types of goods or services.
The health care spending is then separated in subgroups, such as pharmaceuticals,
diagnostic tests and inpatient care. Given the nature of the infection, the budget share
for pharmaceuticals is assigned to antibiotics and other types of drugs. Finally, the
choice is between diﬀerent categories of antibiotics according to their therapeutical
attributes, the risks of bacterial resistance and the cost of treatment.
The individual expenditure function derived from the consumer theory is aggre-
gated across individuals to obtain the antibiotic expenditure in the local market area.5
Muellbauer (1975, 1976) showed that exact aggregation is possible within a specific
family of preferences. These preferences are known as the price independent general-
ized logarithmic (PIGLOG) class of preferences. The PIGLOG class can be denoted
by the following expenditure function, which is the minimum expenditure necessary
to achieve a certain level of utility at any given price
log c(u, p) = (1− u) log a(p) + u log b(p), (1)
where u is the level of utility, a(p) and b(p) represent functions of a price vector p.
5Aggregation theory provides the necessary conditions under which the aggregate demand, i.e.
the representation of market demand, can be treated as if it was the outcome of the decisions of a
rational representative consumer. See Muellbauer (1975) and Cornes (1992) for a general discussion.
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Following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) we assume
log a(p) = α0 +
X
i
αi log pi +
1
2
X
i
X
j
λij log pi log pj (2)
and
log b(p) = log a(p) + β0
Y
i
pβii , (3)
where α0, αi, β0, βi and λij are constants, and i and j are indexes representing diﬀerent
antibiotic categories.
Substituting for log a(p) and log b(p) in (1) we can write the cost function as
log c(u, p) = α0 +
X
i
αi ln pi +
1
2
X
i
X
j
λij log pi log pj + β0u
Y
i
pβii , (4)
which is linearly homogeneous in prices, provided that the following restrictions on
the parameters holdX
i
αi = 1,
X
i
λij =
X
j
λij = 0,
X
i
βi = 0. (5)
By applying the Shephard’s lemma6 and substituing afterwards the indirect utility
function7 derived from (2) we then obtain the expenditure share of the ith group of
anbitiotic substances
wi = αi +
X
j
γij log pj + βi log(x/P ), (6)
where x is the total expenditure for antibiotics in outpatient care8, P is a price index
defined by
logP = α0 +
X
i
αi log pi +
1
2
X
i
X
j
γij log pi log pj (7)
6Demand functions in budget share form are derived from a natural logarithmic diﬀerentiation
of the expenditure function with respect to prices.
7Total expenditure x is equal to c(u, p) for a utility maximising consumer. Hence, c(u, p) can be
inverted to give u(p, x), the indirect utility function.
8We define x =
P
i
piqi as the total expenditure on antibiotics for respiratory infections in out-
patient care, where pi and qi represent the price and the quantity for the ith group of antibiotics by
the representative consumer.
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and
γij =
1
2
(λij + λji). (8)
The following restrictions are implied by (5) and (8)X
i
γij =
X
j
γij = 0, γij = γji ∀ i, j (i 6= j). (9)
Provided that (5), (8) and (9) hold, the equation (6) defines a system of demand
functions. These are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and total expenditure and
satisfy the Slutsky symmetry. The total expenditure is then given by
P
wi = 1.
The interpretation of the demand share summarized by (6) is straightforward.
Without any change in relative prices and expenditures, i.e. the second and the third
terms of the right-hand side of the equation, the budget shares of diﬀerent groups of
antibiotics are constant. Changes in relative prices aﬀect the demand share through
the terms γij. These capture the eﬀect on the i
th budget share from a one percent
increase in the price of the jth category of goods, with x/P held constant. Changes
in real expenditure are taken into account by the parameter βi, which is assumed
equal to zero.
The share equation also underlines some basic properties of the demand function.
Other things being equal, the expenditure share of each group of commodities is
inversely associated with its own price and is positively related to the price of other
goods. The expected sign of γii is then negative. On the other side, γij should exhibit
a positive sign for any i 6= j if goods are close substitutes.
The demand for antibiotics may also be aﬀected by variables other than price that
account for expenditure shifts. For instance, the incidence of infections may imply
seasonal trends in the per capita consumption. Socioeconomic characteristics of the
population and aspects of health care supply may also aﬀect antibiotic use. However,
these aspects may be of little relevance in the demand share of diﬀerent classes of
antibiotics, unless they shape preferences for specific antibiotic categories.
It has been suggested that patients’ age significantly aﬀects the route of adminis-
tration of antibiotics for lower respiratory tract infections (Mazzaglia et al., 1999) and
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the type of antibiotic used (Pendergrast and Marrie, 1999). Moreover, physicians may
have an incentive to prescribe the newer and more expensive antibiotics, i.e. those
with a broader spectrum of activity which apparently reduce risks for patients. Our
model can be easily modified to account for expenditure shifts determined by the
structure of the population and cultural diﬀerences. We also control for practice
status, i.e. whether or not a practice is allowed to directly dispense drugs to the
patients, since this might have an impact on the choice of specific antibiotics. Other
variables, such as the density of doctors, are neglected in this approach.9
Following Ray (1980) and Pollack and Wales (1992), we include the additional
determinants in the model by a log-linear scaling procedure. Cultural and regulatory
diﬀerences (self-dispensing) across regions are taken into account by dummy variables.
From (6) the AIDS model can then be extended to analyse aggregate data on an-
tibiotic consumption across small geographic areas. Assuming separability in quan-
tities consumed for diﬀerent types of goods, we can write
wi = αi+
X
j
γij log pj+βi log(x/P )+
SX
k=1
νikVk+
LX
l=1
φilRl+
TX
t=1
ρitDTt+ui, (10)
where ρit, φil and νik are new parameters and the index i = 1, 2, 3, 4 denote four
groups of antibiotic substances used for respiratory infections summarized in table
1 and discussed in section 3. Vk is a set of variables that capture demographic
and cultural characteristics of the population, Rl (l = 1, .., 23) are practice regulation
dummy, andDTt (t = 1, .., 4) are time dummies. The random term ui is normally and
indentically distributed with variance σ2ε. The expenditure share function is linearly
homogeneous in all the explanatory variables provided that the new parameters, ρit,
φil and νik, satisfy the following conditionX
i
ρit =
X
i
φil =
X
i
νik = 0, (11)
9Determinats of the per capita aggregate demand for antibiotics in outpatient care have been
investigated in a previous study (Filippini et al., 2006).
8
and P is approximated by the Stone’s geometric price index
logP =
X
i
wi log(pi), (12)
where wi is the share of the ith group of antibiotics.10
2.1 Expenditure and price elasticities
We are interested in studying the response of the demand for diﬀerent antibiotic
groups to changes in price and expenditure. We calculate elasticities at the sample
mean of expenditure shares.
Using (6) and (12) we derive the uncompensated (Marshallian) own-price elastic-
ities (εii) and cross-price elasticities (εij) as11
εii = −1 +
γii
wi
− βi, (13)
εij =
γij
wi
− βi
wj
wi
, i 6= j. (14)
Using the Slutsky equation, we then obtain the expenditure elasticity for the ith
antibiotic category given by
ηi = 1 +
βi
wi
. (15)
A positive value suggests that good i is normal.
The income compensated or net (Hicksian) own-price elasticities (δii) and cross-
price elasticities (δij) are obtained by applying the Slutsky decomposition to (15) and
using the price index in (12). These can be written as
δii = −1 +
γii
wi
+ wi, (16)
δij =
γij
wi
+ wj, i 6= j. (17)
10To avoid simultaneity problems we used the median values of the expenditure shares to calculate
the Stone price index defined by equation (12).
11See Alston et al. (1994) and Chalfant (1987) for details.
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Consumer theory suggests that compensated own-price elasticities are negative for
normal goods. Moreover, if (14) and (17) are positive the two groups of antibiotics
are cross substitutes, otherwise they are complements.
Using again the Slutsky equation, it is possible to derive a relationship between the
compensated cross-price elasticities and expenditure elasticities: εij = wjσij − wjηi,
where σij are the partial elasticities of substitution, known also as the Allen elasticities
of substitution
σij = 1 +
γij
wiwj
i 6= j (18)
The sign of σij determines whether the goods i and j are complements or substitutes.
If σij is positive (negative) the two goods are substitutes (complements).
3 Data and variables
Our data cover 240 contiguous market areas representing the whole Swiss territory.
The areas exhibit a good degree of internal homogeneity in terms of population
density and providers of health care. Aggregate data on outpatient antibiotic sales of
diﬀerent classes of antibiotics were provided by IHA-IMS Health Market Research12.
The dataset is detailed at product/brand name and data are available quarterly
for 2002. Since we focus on respiratory infections, we limited our analysis to the
antibiotics mainly used in the treatment of these diseases. We aggregated active
substances according to the antibiotic class and the generation. Consequently, we
kept 66% of the original dataset in terms of sales. We excluded antibiotics with
a parenteral route of administration. Four groups were finally identified (classic
penicillins, penicillins amoxi/clav plus 1st and 2nd generation of cephalosporins, 3rd
generation of cephalosporins and quinolones, macrolides) using the relevant literature
on antibiotic treatments and suggestions by experts. These groups are summarized
in table 1.
12Data on antibiotic sales derive from transactions between wholesalers and pharmacies and physi-
cians.
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Antibiotic group Description
1 Penicillins (classic) Penicillin V, amoxicillin, ampicillin
2 Penicillins (amoxi/clav) and Clavucanic acid/amoxicillin, cefaclor, cefixime,
1st − 2nd generation cefadroxil, cefetamet pivoxil, cefprozil,
cephalosporins cefuroxime axetil
3 3rd generation cephalosporins Ceftibuten, cefpodoxime proxetil, moxifloxacin,
and quinolones levofloxacin
4 Macrolides Erytromycin, clarithromycin, roxithromycin,
azithromycin
Table 1: Antibiotic categories used in the treatment of respiratory infections.
Penicillins are among the first discovered antibiotics and have been largely used
against streptococcus pneumoniae pathogens, which are a primary cause of respira-
tory tract infections (Schito et al., 2000). In particular, classic penicillins (penicillins
V, ampicillin, amoxicillin) are commonly utilized to treat angina from streptococci
and only rarely for other types of respiratory infections. The rate of penicillin-
resistance streptococcus pneumoniae has substantially increased since the mid-1980s
(CDC, 1994).
Newer penicillins (amoxi/clav) can be combined with some cephalosporins since
they belong to the same broad classification (beta-lactams). The spectrum of am-
oxi/clav and 2ndgeneration of cephalosporins are very similar. Observed cross-resist-
ance between cephalosporins and penicillins may imply that patients infected by
penicillin-resistant bacteria may be resistant to cephalosporins as well. The 1st gen-
eration of cephalosporins is currently of very little use.
The 3rd generation of cephalosporins has a broader activity spectrum compared
to previous generations, which implies that it can be used against a larger variety
of bacteria. Consequently, it is suitable for more severe infections. Nevertheless, it
is generally used as an alternative to the 2nd generation. Practices may significantly
vary across the areas since some doctors are more likely than others to preserve the
3rd generation for more resistant bacteria.
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Similarly, quinolones have a large range of antibacterial activity, which includes
multidrug resistant strains responsible for respiratory tract infections. Since this
category should also be used with caution and better preserved for more severe
cases, we considered it in a group together with the 3rd generation of cephalosporins.
When the nature of the infection is uncertain and doctors are quite risk averse,
3rd generation of cephalosporins and quinolones may be preferred to penicillins and
other cephalosporins.
Finally, macrolides are generally known as an alternative to beta-lactams. In some
cases, bacterial resistance is more severe than for penicillins. Resistance to macrolides
has increased over time among penicillin-resistant pneumococci and penicillin-suscepti-
ble strains. The preference for either penicillins or macrolides may then depend upon
established local practices and patients preferences.
Average prices of each antibiotic group have been imputed using expenditure data
and quantities. Quantities are measured in days of treatment (DOT) and prices are
consequently defined in currency units per one day of treatment. A daily dose is
standardised by the WHO.
Min Mean SD Max
Expenditure share
1 0.018 0.093 0.029 0.233
2 0.149 0.463 0.069 0.704
3 0 0.141 0.056 0.430
4 0.154 0.303 0.073 0.787
Price
1 0.974 1.589 0.212 2.639
2 2.331 3.340 0.220 4.018
3 4.974 5.935 0.291 7.451
4 3.614 4.787 0.344 6.086
Table 2: Summary statistics of budget shares and prices for diﬀerent groups of sub-
stances.
Table 2 gives some summary statistics of expenditure shares and prices for the four
groups of substances. Penicillins (amoxi/clav) and early generations of cephalosporins
and macrolides represent the largest shares of the expenditure. Note, however, that
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strong diﬀerences are observed across the areas. These categories may account for
15% only of the total expenditure. On the other hand, in some areas they are largely
used and may reach a share of more than 70%.
Information on the other variables included in the model are also obtained from
IHA-IMS (table ??). Demographic variables include the share of the population
classified in 5 ranges of age. Note, for instance, that individuals under 26 represent
less than 1% of the total population in some areas and more than 20% in others.
Similarly, the proportion of people between 60 and 74 largely varies across areas,
from 9.5% to almost 25%. Areas located at the border with other European countries
represent 12.5% of the total number of areas. French and Italian speaking areas are
43.7% and are generally characterized by a more intensive use of antibiotic per capita.
We defined a dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if the area has a Latin
culture (French and Italian) and 0 otherwise. A dummy has also been defined for
borderland location. Finally, the impact of self-dispensing practices is captured by a
dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if most practices in the area (> 50%) are
self-dispensing practices, and 0 otherwise. Around 23% of the areas exhibit a large
proportion of self-dispensing practices.
Variable Description Min Mean Max
POP1 Population under 14/total population 0.088 0.166 0.218
POP2 Population between 15 and 25/total population 0.069 0.125 0.185
POP3 Population between 26 and 59/total population 0.423 0.495 0.638
POP4 Population between 60 and 74/total population 0.095 0.136 0.249
POP5 Population over 74/total population 0.034 0.077 0.139
DBOR Areas with a borderland location 0.125
DLAT Areas with a Latin culture 0.437
SELF Areas with a rate of self-dispensing practices 0.233
above 50%
Table 3: Variables notation and summary statistics.
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4 Estimation results
The AIDS model defined by equation (10) is used to investigate the expenditure
shares of the four groups of antibiotics for respiratory infections. Independent vari-
ables include the prices of diﬀerent antibiotic categories, consumer expenditure, de-
mographic and cultural aspects of the local demand, seasonal dummies and practice
status. All explanatory variables are expressed in natural logarithms, with the ex-
ception of dummy variables.
We estimated the model through the Zellner’s Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Re-
gression (SUR) procedure with STATA. The set of restrictions led to a singular resid-
ual variance/covariance matrix. Consequently, we dropped one share equation from
the system. This is the first category, classic penicillins, which represents the smallest
budget share on average across the four groups. Using the estimated parameters of
the share equations of the other three groups and the restrictions applied above, we
then obtained the parameters for the dropped category.
Results are reported in Table 4. Each equation has been estimated with 960 ob-
servations, since data for 240 areas were quarterly available. The adjusted R2 is 0.262,
0.369 and 0.387, respectively for group 2 (penicillins amoxi/clav and early genera-
tions of cephalosporins), group 3 (3rd generation of cephaloporines and quinolones)
and group 4 (macrolides).
The impact of consumer expenditure on the demand share of group 3 is positive,
whereas it is negative for groups 2 and 4. Note, however, that the value is close to
zero and the expenditure coeﬃcient is significant at less than 1% for macrolides only.
Moreover, the sign of the latter coeﬃcient cannot be a proof of inferior type of goods,
since the dependent variable is the budget share rather than quantity. As detailed
in table 5 below, income elasticities are all positive, which suggests that diﬀerent
outpatient antibiotic categories are normal goods.
Similarly, price elasticities will be analysed later on in section 4.1. Price coef-
ficients are not very informative at this stage. Most of them are significant at less
than 1% with few exceptions, but the demand for amoxi/clav and cephalosporins
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Penicillins (amoxi/clav) 3rd generation
and 1st - 2nd generations cephalosporins Macrolides
cephalosporins and quinolones
Obs. 960 960 960
R2 0.262 0.369 0.387
Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E.
Constant 0.758∗∗∗ 0.073 0.211∗∗∗ 0.056 0.211∗∗∗ 0.071
P1 -0.021∗∗ 0.010 0.077∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.050∗∗∗ 0.010
P2 0.248∗∗∗ 0.027 -0.141∗∗∗ 0.018 0.086∗∗∗ 0.022
P3 -0.141∗∗∗ 0.018 0.031 0.023 0.032∗ 0.019
P4 -0.086∗∗∗ 0.022 0.032∗ 0.019 0.104∗∗∗ 0.027
x/P -0.000 0.004 0.004 0.003 -0.013∗∗∗ 0.004
POP1 -0.008 0.028 0.035∗ 0.021 -0.027 0.027
POP2 0.054∗∗ 0.027 -0.025 0.020 0.006 0.026
POP4 0.032∗ 0.018 -0.005 0.014 -0.004 0.018
POP5 0.008 0.010 0.032∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.037∗∗∗ 0.009
DBOR 0.010 0.006 -0.005 0.005 -0.015∗∗ 0.006
DLAT -0.015∗∗ 0.006 0.042∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.025∗∗∗ 0.006
SELF -0.034∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.003 0.005 0.040∗∗∗ 0.006
DT1 -0.039∗∗∗ 0.006 0.020∗∗∗ 0.004 0.024∗∗∗ 0.005
DT2 0.004 0.006 0.012∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.037∗∗∗ 0.005
DT3 0.042∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.007∗ 0.004 -0.050∗∗∗ 0.005
∗ significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Table 4: Parameter estimates for the restricted linear approximate AIDS model of
antibiotic groups.
I-II (group 2) and the demand for macrolides (group 4) are unexpectedly positively
aﬀected by their own prices and negatively related to the price of other categories.
However, the result cannot be interpreted as a sign of complementarity rather than
substitution with other categories.
The demand share of all of the four antibiotic categories is significantly aﬀected
by the structure of the population and cultural aspects. We used the age class 26-59
(POP3) as the baseline category. The signs of POP2 and POP4 suggest that a higher
proportion of individuals between 15 and 25 years of age and between 60 and 74 in the
area has a positive impact on the share of penicillins and cephalosporins I-II (group
2) used. On the other hand, we did not find clear evidence that a higher proportion
of children (POP1) negatively aﬀects the share of penicillins and positively aﬀects the
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share of macrolides. According to Otters et al. (2004), there has been a decrease in
the proportion of narrow-spectrum antibiotics prescribed for children between 1987
and 2001 in the Netherlands. By contrast, the proportion of macrolides increased
from 8% to 16%. Similarly, Schindler et al. (2004) showed that macrolides were
the most frequently prescribed antibiotics (48.1%) for respiratory infections among
children aged between 0 and 6 in Germany.
However, we can show that an increasing proportion of elderly people (POP5)
positively aﬀects the antibiotic share of cephalosporins III and quinolones and has a
negative impact on the demand share of macrolides (group 4). The result is in accor-
dance with findings by Mazzaglia et al. (1999), who suggested that cephalosporins
are the antibiotics most frequently prescribed for lower respiratory tract infections in
adults, while macrolides are the less prescribed.
The borderland location seems to reduce the demand share of specific antibi-
otic categories such as macrolides. Accordingly, areas with a French/Italian culture
exhibit a significantly lower consumption of macrolides (group 4), penicillins and
cephalosporins I-II (group 2) compared to areas with a German culture. On the
other hand, there is a higher consumption share of 3rd generation cephalosporins and
quinolones. Similar diﬀerences are observed at a larger scale across European coun-
tries. France and Italy, for instance, use a relatively larger amount of 3rdgeneration
cephalosporins compared to other European countries (Coenen et al. 2006).
Self-dispensing practices seem to contribute, at least partially, to a larger use of
more expensive antibiotics, ceteris paribus. The estimated coeﬃcients indicate that a
high proportion of self dispensing-practices is significantly related to a larger demand
share of macrolides (group 4). As a consequence, self-dispensing practices are also
associated with a lower demand share of penicillins and cephalosporins I-II (group
2), which are less expensive than macrolides on average.
The current literature argues that dispensing doctors have a tendency to pre-
scribe more medicines per capita than non dispensing physicians (Trap et al. 2002).
The evidence, however, does not directly imply that self-dispensing physicians are
more likely to prescribe more expensive antibacterials, ceteris paribus. There are
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some possible explanations for the behaviour of dispensing doctors. First, it may be
that dispensing doctors are more risk averse and, therefore, perceive a lower risk in
prescribing newer versions of pharmaceuticals with a broader spectrum. Accordingly,
Morton-Jones and Pringle (1993) found that prescribing costs per patient are gener-
ally higher for dispensing doctors. Another explanation may derive from Howard’s
view that the increasing rate of bacterial resistance could lead general practitioners
to substitute away from older and inexpensive drugs to newer and often more expen-
sive antibiotics (Howard, 2004). Our findings suggest that this eﬀect is stronger for
self-dispensing doctors who are directly involved in the distribution of drugs. A third
reason is related to a profit maximizing behaviour, since doctors get a mark up on
directly dispensed drugs or may be influenced by eﬀective marketing strategies set
by pharmaceutical companies.
Finally, seasonal eﬀects are highly significant. Note that the share of more expen-
sive antibiotics (group 3 and 4) is higher in winter (1st quarter) and lower during the
summer (3rd quarter). This may be related to doctors’ risk aversion in periods when
the incidence of infections is generally higher. Accordingly, patients’ willingness to
pay for drugs may raise with the perceived risk of infection. By contrast, less expen-
sive antibiotics, such as penicillins and early generations of cephalosporins, are used
less often during the 1st quarter and more often in the summer quarter.
4.1 Elasticities
Using the estimation results from table 4 and applying the definitions derived in
section 2.1, we calculate the own-price, cross-price and expenditure elasticities of the
demand for antibiotic categories. The figures are summarized in tables 5 and 6. Some
important implications can be straightfowardly derived.
Looking at the expenditure elasticitities in table 5, we notice that these are pos-
itive for all antibiotic groups. The result suggests that antibiotics are normal goods
and is in accordance with Baye et al. (1997), who estimated that anti-infectives have
positive income elasticity (1.331). More specifically, Chaudhuri et al. (2003) observed
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Uncompensated Compensated Expenditure
price elasticities price elasticities elasticities
Classic -1.009 -0.906 1.095
penicillins
Penicillins (amoxi/clav)
and 1st - 2nd generation -0.464 -0.001 1
cephalosporins
3rd generation
cephalosporins -1 -0.859 1
and quinolones
Macrolides -0.643 -0.353 0.958
Table 5: Price elasticities and expenditure elasticities evaluated at the sample mean.
positive expenditure elasticities for diﬀerent types of quinolones, ranging from 0.3 to
2.20. Since our expenditure elasticities are close to one, the consumption share of each
group of antibiotics remains constant as the amount spent on other groups changes.
The evidence then indicates that antibiotics in outpatient care can be denoted as
necessities. As income raises, the need for additional consumption of antibiotics is
negligible, ceteris paribus.
All uncompensated own-price elasticities have the expected negative sign and vary
substantially from -1.009 to -0.464. The comparison with the existing literature is not
straightforward, although some similarities might be pointed out. Focusing on anti-
infectives, Baye et al. (1997) estimated uncompensated own-price elasticity equal
to -0.916. Ellison et al. (1997) found significant and negative uncompensated own-
price elasticities for the four types of cephalosporins analysed. Looking at quinolones
only, Chaudhuri et al (2003) calculated a relatively high uncompensated own-price
elasticity, equal to -2.5 on average and ranging from -0.45 to -5.5.
Our estimates indicate that the demand for 3rd generation cephalosporins and
quinolones (group 3) and the demand for classic penicillins (group 1) are more
price elastic than the demand for penicillins amoxi/clav and 1st and 2nd genera-
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Classic Penicillins 3rd generation Macrolides
penicillins (amoxi/clav) cephalosporins
and 1st- 2nd gen. and quinolones
cephalosporins
Classic
penicillins - 0.509 6.873 -0.076
Penicillins
(amoxi/clav) - - -1.158 0.388
and 1st- 2nd gen.
cephalosporins
3rd generation
cephalosporins - - - 1.749
and quinolones
Table 6: Allen elasticity of substitution between two groups of antibiotics.
tion cephalosporins (group 2) and the demand for macrolides (group 4). It is worth
noticing that the highest own-price elasticities are found for the most expensive an-
tibiotic category (group 3) and the traditional and less frequently used antibiotics
(classic penicillins). The rationale may be that doctors and patients are more likely
to increase or reduce the consumption of the latest generation of cephalosporins and
quinolones when their price changes, since this category of antibiotics is at least par-
tially used to reduce uncertainty on the severity of the infection and the implications
in terms of bacterial resistance. On the other hand, they are less likely to leave com-
monly used antibiotic therapies such as previous generations of cephalosporins, peni-
cillins and macrolides. Classic penicillins represent a traditional antibiotic therapy
whose comparative advantage has been substantially undermined by better alterna-
tives. Consequently, they may be quite sensitive to variations in relative prices.
As expected, the Hicksian own-price elasticities are smaller in magnitude com-
pared to the Marshallian elasticitites. This suggests that the pure eﬀect of substitu-
tion is only partially compensated by the income eﬀect.
Substitution and complementary relationships among antibiotic groups are cap-
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tured by the Allen elasticities presented in table 6. Positive values denote that
two groups are substitutes. In our case, narrow spectrum antibiotics such as peni-
cillins amoxi/clav and early generations of cephalosporins do not appear to be good
substitutes for antibiotics with a larger spectrum such as new cephalosporins and
quinolones. The rationale may be that old generations of cephalosporins are not
perceived to be eﬀective against severe infections. Moreover, newer generations are
generally taken into account to overcome specific problems of bacterial resistance
encountered in the use of previous generations.
As a consequence, doctors may prefer to switch to classic penicillins or macrolides
rather than to the latest generations of cephalosporins and quinolones when the price
of group 2 increases. This hypothesis is in accordance with the positive sign of
elasticities of substitution between group 3 and groups 1 and 4.
The Allen’s elasticity of substitution confirms that the demand for classic peni-
cillins follows the demand for macrolides when the price of the latter category changes.
The result may be associated to a certain degree of persistency in patients’ tastes.
For instance, doctors argue that children have a preference for macrolides rather than
penicillins. This could imply that an increase in the price of macrolides is likely to
induce a higher consumption of cephalosporins or newer antibiotic components, thus
driving the utilization of classic penicillins downward, ceteris paribus.
5 Conclusion
The demand for antibiotics has been investigated in the studies by Ellison et al. (1997)
and Chaudhuri (2003). The focus is on specific market segments where antibiotic
substances constitute very close theraperutic substitutes and are similar in terms of
the impact of bacterial resistance. There are, however, arguments for considering a
more extendend set of drugs.
We propose a model of the demand for antibiotics for respiratory infections pre-
scribed in outpatient care. We aggregate therapeutic components in a reasonable
number of categories to define the doctor’s plausible choice set. Therapeutic proper-
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ties and the risk of bacterial resistance are then simultaneously taken into account.
Conversely from previous studies, our linear approximate almost ideal demand system
model includes determinats of the demand structure other than price, such as demo-
graphic and cultural characteristics of the population and practice self-dispensing
status.
The results lead us to the conclusion that the highest demand elasticities are ob-
served for the 3rd generation cephalosporins and quinolones, the newer and more ex-
pensive antibiotic category, and classic penicillins, the most traditional and cheapest
category. We found complementary eﬀects between antibiotics with a relative nar-
row spectrum (penicillins amoxi/clav and cephalosporins I-II) and antibiotics with a
relative large spectrum (3rd generation cephalosporins and quinolones), and between
classic penicillins and macrolides. On the other hand, demand elasticity suggests
a good degree of substitution between the other categories, i.e. diﬀerent types of
penicillins, macrolides and early cephalosporins, 3rd generation cephalosporins and
macrolides.
As for the impact of population characteristics, we observed that an increas-
ing proportion of elderly people positively aﬀects the proportion of new cephalospo-
rins/quinolones and reduces the proportion of macrolides used. The Latin culture
is associated with a more substantial use of new cephalosporins/quinolones and
macrolides and a lower proportion of penicillins amoxi/clav and cephalosporins I-
II.
We found evidence that self-dispensing practices have a tendency to shift upward
the demand share for newer and more expensive antibiotics and to reduce the demand
share of traditional and less expensive antibiotics such as penicillins amoxi/clav and
cephalosporins I-II.
In our view these results are important because of current policy interest in bat-
tling bacterial resistance and promoting a correct use of antibiotics. Our findings help
to enlighten the pharmaceutical purchasing process and doctors’ behaviour. Health
care policy makers could then shape reforms by taking into account the incentives to
prescribe diﬀerent antibiotic substitutes. More eﬀective dissemination of information
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on prices and the impact of bacterial resistance to physicians and patients might be
an example of measure to improve eﬃciency in the use of antibiotics.
Moreover, our results suggest that the introduction of a local tax on the antibi-
otic components that are responsible for higher levels of bacterial resistance may
contribute to change the antibiotic mix and, therefore, to improve eﬃciency in an-
tibiotic consumption. Since overconsumption determines a negative externality for
the society, there might be good reasons for supporting this special mechanism of
taxation.
Finally, data on the incidence of bacterial resistance at a local level are not easily
available. We think that it would be advisable to promote their regular collection and
to use them in new studies in order to see what eﬀect they may have on antibiotic
prescribing practices, and more generally on the econometric results.
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